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Abstract 
In our view, the causes of the crisis are tied to the political change towards a Neoliberal phase 
from the 1970s on: a wide process of “deregulation” – from the labour market to the 
globalisation of production, from the national to the international finance – has allowed a partial 
recovery in the profitability of the capitalist system, contrasting the post-war decline of the 
profit rate which led to the 1970s “stagflation”. The same key elements of the Neoliberal model 
– deregulation, financialisation, globalisation –  have eventually led to a large crisis as a result 
of the huge increase of inequality, financial instability, and trade imbalances. In this perspective, 
the “financial crisis” is the signal of underlying problems concerning the global process of 
capital accumulation. It is now necessary to support a recovery of the public intervention (“top 
down”) in order to create the conditions for an economic restart that, in turn, would strengthen 
the construction of a radical alternative (from the “bottom up”) to the Neoliberal course. A 
wider access to education should be the key to this progressive strategy aimed at supporting a 
more egalitarian and green path of development. A radical rethinking of bequest taxation and, in 
general, of the taxation on wealth would have a clear symbolic value in this perspective, 
providing, at the same time, the material basis for extending the right to a “universal education”. 
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It seems that the considerable increase in public debt, following the “socialisation of 
private losses” caused by the recent crisis in many countries, has become the main 
problem of many Western countries, in particular in the Euro area. Many commentators 
argue that to overcome the crisis “austerity” measures are necessary. Others, on the 
contrary, think that restrictive policies will result in a severe recession, and a worsening 
of public finances. So, there are alternative positions with respect to the economic 
policy measures to fight the crisis, depending on those we think are its causes. 
 
On the one hand, explaining the recent events as a “financial crisis” (with “real effects” 
such as the rise of unemployment), due to the failure of specific aspects of financial 
markets or bad economic policies (e.g., a too loose monetary policy that led to extreme 
financial risk or a profligate fiscal policy that led to excessive public debts) might 
suggest a “technical” solution to the problems emerged, to continue, then, on the 
Neoliberal path “once repaired some gaps”. On the other hand, considering the current 
problems as the result of a “systemic crisis”, due to “real causes” (with a relevant role of 
finance which first delayed and then amplified the crisis), could instead suggest a 
radical change aimed at supporting the emergence of a new model of economic 
development. 
 
 
The origins of the crisis 
 
In our view, the causes of the crisis are tied to the political change toward a “Neoliberal 
phase” which took place in the late 1970s and 1980s, when Keynesian demand 
management, implemented as a response to the Great Depression and in the aftermath of 
WWII, exhausted its role because of a  changing structure of the US and other advanced 
economies (Hossein-Zadeh, 2011). Then, a wide process of deregulation – from  the 
labour market to the globalisation of production, from the national to the international 
finance – has allowed a partial recovery in the profitability of the capitalist system, 
contrasting the post-war decline in the rate of profit which led to the “stagflation” of the 
1970s.1 This was followed by an ongoing decline of the labour share (especially for 
low-skilled workers) and a rise of inequality (IMF, 2007). The cuts to the welfare state 
have been partly offset by the “wealth effect” produced by stock market and real estate 
bubbles, while the expansion of consumer credit has “temporarily solved” the potential 
lack of aggregate demand.2 Moreover, the profits derived from the restructuring of 
power relations due to the deregulation process were only partly reinvested in the real 
economy of Western countries. Instead, an increasing share of production has been set 
in low-cost countries (in fact the average growth rates of developed countries from the 
1970s onward have been lower than in previous decades, while emerging countries 
grew at high rates), while another share of profits, more and more important, inflated 
the financial sector. 
 
                                                 
1
 On the decline of US profits and the successive recovery in the 1980s, both at the aggregate and the 
sector levels, see Uctum and Viana (1999). For a wide-ranging analysis of the rate of profit and its real 
and financial determinants see Duménil and Lévy (2004). 
2
 So a growing inequality-easy credit nexus emerges underlying the financial crisis (Rajan, 2010). 
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Therefore, in the absence of an extension of finance, the stagnation of real wages in the 
last decades (for a vast fraction of workers) would have resulted in an overproduction 
crisis (in Western economies) before the recent years. Accordingly, the expansion of 
finance has operated as a countertendency to the decline of the real sectors’ profit rate. 
As time elapsed, the accumulation of debts and the growing complexity of financial 
products and credit interlinkages have produced an unstable system which eventually 
collapsed. So, we can combine two major theoretical approaches: the Minskian 
viewpoint on financial fragility and a Marxian interpretation of capitalist contradictions. 
One of the basic contradictions is that there is not a simple correspondence between 
micro aspects and macro properties in a “monetary economy of production”: for 
example, the reduction of wages paid by a firm (“micro”) may, by reducing costs, lead 
to increased profitability of the single firm; but if the wage reduction is generalised, 
then the cost reduction for firms also leads to a drop in aggregate demand (“macro”). In 
other words, a fall of wages hinders the process of valorisation of capital through the 
sale of commodities in the markets. As a consequence, a behaviour that can be 
beneficial at the individual level can become disadvantageous when considered 
collectively. Indeed, the crisis of capital valorisation due to overproduction involves a 
change in entrepreneurs’ behaviour that perceive a higher risk and start thinking that the 
best way to accumulate (or at least preserve) capital is to hold liquid money, so an 
unemployment crisis follows. In recent decades, the support of aggregate demand 
through credit consumption, and in general through financial incomes, has postponed 
the outbreak of the crisis. But, the expansion of the financial sector have also resulted in 
an increase of financial fragility and, therefore, in a growing macroeconomic instability 
which has eventually led to a large crisis. 
 
According to Foley (2010a), while the 1970s crisis (as well as the 1890s depression) 
was due to “the tendency for the rate of profit to fall” (the fundamental phenomenon 
that gives rise to the falling rate of profit scenario is upward pressure on wages), the 
recent crisis (as well as the Great Depression) is rather the consequence of “a rising rate 
of exploitation” (which is instead rooted in the stagnation of wages, aggressive pursuit 
of cost reduction, and price deflation), and then of the increasing difficulty faced by 
societies in managing a large and growing surplus value, with great demands on the 
financial system to recycle it (Foley, 2010a). All in all, the deregulation wave has 
boosted profits and capital accumulation through allowing labour market flexibility, a 
global relocation of production and increasingly risky financial transactions. 
 
However, the same key elements of the Neoliberal model – deregulation, 
financialisation, globalisation –  have then produced a crescendo of crisis, until the most 
recent (and maybe beyond), as a result of the huge increase in income and wealth 
inequality, financial instability and trade imbalances. Meanwhile, China and other 
emerging countries have become more and more important for the economic and 
political global balances as a result of an enlargement of the “container” of capitalist 
development, supported by the same advanced countries (foreign direct investments, 
multinational corporations, etc). This may suggest a shift of the centre of capital 
accumulation towards south-east, while the West suffers the problems arising from the 
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excesses of the financial belle époque of the last years and sets off a relative decline.3 In 
this perspective, the “financial crisis” is the signal of underlying problems concerning 
the evolution of the global process of capitalist development. 
 
 
Ways out of the crisis 
 
In our opinion, the austerity policies that should solve the problem of public finances, 
especially for Europe but also for other “advanced countries”, not only will be unable to 
do it (for the reasons mentioned above)4 but they have another purpose: to extend the 
twilight of the Neoliberal phase of capitalism. The austerity policies can be considered 
as the logical consequence of the cracks opened in the process of capitalist 
accumulation and they aim at postponing the end of this phase. For example, financial 
capital has an interest in speculating on government bonds of the peripheral European 
countries, resulting in higher yields, while the problem of sustainability of public 
finances is deferred at each manoeuvre by governments, requiring more and more 
sacrifices to the majority of the population to save the countries from bankruptcy. 
Moreover, the worsening of public finances has led or is leading some European 
countries to borrow money from institutions like the EU, the ECB or the IMF (or 
emerging countries); in fact, the conditions imposed on debtors for financial aid – 
liberalisation, privatisation, etc. – will contribute to expand profit opportunities for 
private capital (paralleling a decrease of the interest rate paid on bonds). Meanwhile, a 
further reduction of the “rigidity” of the labour market should ensure profit margins to 
keep in the productive sectors and let the capital free to move towards other productive 
places (for example, emerging countries), or toward finance. In this way, there is an 
extension in the length of the crisis, but the underlying problems remain unsolved, until 
the next collapse. 
 
Since the goal should be to overcome the crisis in advance (moving the load to the 
upper classes at the same time), a default of indebted countries could be useful, 
according to some commentators,5 to avoid heavy sacrifices to a large part of population 
that are just profits for the financial capital. But there are some problems in such a 
strategy. A programmed default has some technical difficulties and consequences of 
national and international relevance.  For example: (i) the default should be “selective”, 
to avoid hitting the savings of that part of population that should be protected from the 
sacrifices required by the strategy of austerity.  However, it seems unlikely to not pay 
back the debts associated to the same title if owned by some institutions (e.g., financial 
institutions) and pay them back if owned by people such as workers or retired; (ii) 
international markets, for a certain period of time, would avoid financing the countries 
that decide to go into default; (iii) as a consequence for Europe there might be a way out 
and a devaluation of the Euro (which indirectly could further reduce wages, through 
higher prices of imported goods). Furthermore, on the one hand, the break up of the 
Euro and the return to national currencies would make it again available to each country 
the instrument of the monetary policy to ensure the public debt through the intervention 
                                                 
3
 This interpretation is based on Arrighi (1994). See also Arrighi (2007). 
4
 See also De Long and Summers (2012). 
5
 See, for instance, Skaperdas (2011). 
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of the central bank. On the other, however, we must consider that the conversion of debt 
from Euro into a national devalued currency would produce effects similar to the 
default, with a probable wave of bank failures, with vast international consequences.6  
 
In our opinion, it would be better to increase the taxation on wealth (that a minority of 
the population has accumulated in recent decades) to stabilise the debt/GDP ratio over 
the medium term, mainly through an increase in its denominator. As regards in 
particular Europe, this should be part of an economic policy based on a common project 
of public intervention. In other words, the sustainability of public finances in the Euro 
area would be ensured by the “credibility” of the political change at the base of a new 
direction for economic development, with the crucial support of the central bank. In this 
perspective, government bailouts should be done as “nationalisations” or participation 
to the capital in proportion to the intervention implemented, in a context where (also for 
the Euro area, with a change in the political and institutional situation) the central banks 
play an active role as lenders of last resort in support of governments (De Grauwe, 
2011). This strategy, however, would be incomplete if the public sector, thanks to a 
direct management of the credit or a sharing of banking decisions too, did not play the 
necessary role of engine of a new development phase, creating the basis for new profit 
opportunities for private capital, in a perspective of public-private collaboration. The 
increased profitability would then divert the attention of the capital from profits 
obtainable from the privatisation of common goods (water, education, culture, etc.) and 
by financial speculation, which should be limited through a revision in the regulation of 
credit and financial markets, challenging the primacy given to the financial liquidity and 
changing those rules that have triggered a severe financial crisis (Orléan, 2009). In 
particular, the public sector should promote investments in labour intensive sectors 
(education, research, healthcare, services, etc.) – reversing the trend which is instead 
characterising the evolution of the current crisis – and those linked to green 
technologies and energy saving. 
 
In a recession, public investment would not substitute the private investment but it 
rather would create the conditions for its increase when the crisis ends. The Keynesian 
policy of support to the aggregate demand, rightly directing the investments, would also 
be an “industrial policy” which, with an appropriate spending on education, would help 
the transition to new production specializations of the workers “trapped” in the sectors 
with decreasing incomes. The fall of incomes can be the result of the increase in 
productivity (for instance, in agriculture during the Great Depression7 or in 
                                                 
6
 This does not mean that a restructuring of public debts (for instance, lengthening the maturity) is not 
possible. Moreover, the complex process regarding Greece shows that even a significant ‘haircut’ of 
public debt’s nominal value can be reached without causing financial disasters (despite the very negative 
expectations regarding, for example, the decision to consider this event as a default triggering the 
repayment of credit default swaps). 
7
 “The Great Depression coincided with the decline of U.S. agriculture; indeed, agriculture prices were 
falling even before the stock market crash in 1929. Increases in agriculture productivity were so great that 
a small percentage of the population could produce all the food that the country could consume. The 
transition from an economy based on agriculture to one where manufacturing predominated was not easy. 
In fact, the economy only resumed growing when the New Deal kicked in and World War II got people 
working in factories.” (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 24). 
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manufacturing in recent decades8), with a potentially negative impact of lower demand 
on other sectors, leading to a large crisis. For these reasons we need a government 
stimulus designed not to preserve the old economy but to focus instead on creating a 
new one (Stiglitz, 2012).9 And the sectors in which to invest are education and green 
technologies so to boost long run economic growth based on “human capital” 
accumulation, R&D activities, and environmental sustainability. 
 
European countries could follow this way by acting as a political unity to support 
economic growth and a fall of inequality. In other words, Europe should act as one 
towards this direction (from the integration of fiscal policies to the organisation of 
social conflict) and the idea of Eurobonds, to safeguard the financial stability of the 
Euro and, above all, to finance the public action on a European scale, should be carried 
out. This could be reached through a strategy which is at odd with the one 
characterising the current evolution. The peripheral European countries are now 
applying austerity measures to reduce the “spread” on their public debts (with respect to 
the German interest rate) and they are reforming their labour markets (and further 
liberalise other sectors) to allow more flexibility. The goal seems to be clear: a 
reduction of wages which should lead to a depreciation of the periphery’s real exchange 
rates with respect to those of core countries, and an adjustment of trade imbalances 
among Euro area countries should follow. Indeed, peripheral countries should recover 
some competitiveness, so obtaining a rise of exports because of lower production costs. 
This result may be facilitated moving the fiscal burden from direct to indirect taxation 
(e.g., value added tax). Not only the fall of wages would lead to lower production costs, 
this also would result in a decrease of imports because a lower households’ disposable 
income, so improving net exports. For this reason we can expect that countries now 
displaying trade surpluses, like Germany, are going to focus their commercial strategy 
on meeting the demand from (the rich of) emerging countries, given the expected 
compression of the peripheral countries’ incomes. Therefore, it is likely that the neo-
Mercantilist strategy of the Euro area’s core countries will be based less on the 
European domestic market, including the periphery, and more on the demand from 
outside Europe. 
 
To contrast this tendency in Europe, and in general to reverse the Neoliberal course 
around the world, alternative projects should find a strong political support, that at the 
moment is around different protest movements, but in many cases it is not guaranteed (it 
is opposed) by the ruling class. The probable worsening of the crisis will lead, in our 
opinion, to a wider support for a radical alternative. But we should anticipate that. To 
this end, the opponents to the Neoliberal strategy of the crisis management (from 
“Occupy Wall Street” to the indignados movements around the world, from some 
political and social forces to the trade unions) should carefully consider the economic 
and political assumptions of the part to fight, as well as of their own actions, in order to 
                                                 
8
 “Today the underlying trend in the United States is the move away from manufacturing and into the 
service sector. As before, this is partly because of the success in increasing productivity in manufacturing. 
… But in the United States and Europe, there is an additional dimension: globalization, which has meant 
a shift in the locus of production and comparative advantage to China, India, and other developing 
countries.” (Stiglitz, 2010, pp. 24-5). 
9
 See also Delli Gatti et al. (2012). 
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improve the effectiveness of social conflict. In fact, the “material conditions” of the 
crisis evolution (high unemployment, labour flexibility, fiscal austerity) are not the most 
suitable to set up a policy change. In the current situation, the Neoliberal management 
of the crisis tends to strengthen the bases of capitalist accumulation (with the 
consequence of a further working class weakening). In this context, however, violence 
for its own sake is to be avoided, as it constitutes a strategy which could lead to a 
repressive turn, we want to avoid, and that could ensure, instead, a continuation of the 
Neoliberal phase, through further contrasting the social conflict. It is therefore necessary 
to politically support a recovery of the public intervention – “top down” – in order to 
create the conditions for an economic restart that, in turn, would strengthen the 
construction of a radical alternative to the Neoliberal course – from the “bottom up”.10  
 
 
A well educated way out… 
 
A wider access to education should be the key to this progressive project aimed at 
supporting a more egalitarian model of development. There are many differences among 
human beings, but in our opinion, common features outweigh the differences, which are 
mainly due to the socio-economic context.11 Consider the example given by Adam 
Smith: “The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than 
we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of 
different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much 
the cause as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most 
dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, 
seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, custom, and education” (Smith, 
1776, Book I, Chapter 2). Education can play a central role to reduce the negative social 
implications of the unavoidable division of labour, being a central issue for both 
economic development and a conscious participation of people in public life. “The 
purpose of education is not simply to enhance workplace skills. In an increasingly 
complex society, knowledge is required to act effectively as a consumer and a citizen. If 
democracy is to survive in the face of growing complexity, then education must play a 
major part” (Hodgson, 2003, p. 477). In our view, a radical rethinking of the inheritance 
tax and, in general, of the taxation on wealth would have a clear symbolic value in this 
perspective, providing, at the same time, the material basis for extending the right to a 
universal education.12 
 
A large public investment plan mainly aimed at enlarging education opportunities, to 
support a new growth process based on knowledge and scientific research, would have a 
                                                 
10
 On the interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes in a complex system such as the capitalist 
one, see Foley (2010b). 
11
 For a recent analysis see Flynn (2008). 
12
 For instance, starting from the empirical observation that the educational attainment is influenced by 
the family background, and then that people who get higher educational levels are not necessarily the 
most talented, Staffolani and Valentini (2007) maintained that a bequest taxation whose yield is 
redistributed among the “youths” increases efficiency. Moreover, according to the Keynesian perspective 
about the social philosophy towards which the General Theory might lead, bequest taxation (together with 
progressive income taxation) is the way the society should follow to counteract the tendency of capitalism 
towards an unequal and arbitrary distribution of income and wealth (Keynes, 1936).  
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relevant political impact on economic and social evolution. Indeed, the public sector 
would lead this development either directly, through assuming new workers in the 
university, research centres, and so on, or indirectly, by supporting private R&D 
investments and, in general, the transition towards a more “advanced” (knowledge-
based and green) model of development. Indeed, the public sector would support a 
change towards full employment, taking care of orienting investments in the desired 
direction (as said above, Keynesian sustain to aggregate demand would function also as 
industrial policy), so radically changing the political bases that have supported the 
Neoliberal phase of capitalist development, as described above. In other words, we must 
consider the political aspects of full employment (Kalecki, 1943) related to such an 
education-based development path. 
 
Indeed, this important change in economic policy would impact the income and wealth 
distribution: firstly, because the financial resources to support the public sector initiative 
should come from the large wealth accumulated in past decades (so reducing public 
debts or allowing public expenditures without huge deficits); secondly, a rise of 
employment (especially in high-skilled sectors) would lead to a rise of wages, due to a 
narrowing of the “industrial reserve army” of unemployed people, so increasing the 
labour share, with beneficial effects on the aggregate demand. In this perspective, the 
emergence of a new development model supported by the public sector would be 
coupled with a reduced inequality.13 
 
The fall of inequality could be a possible consequence of the transition towards a 
knowledge-based economy in which immaterial production and human skills become 
increasingly important. Indeed, when the engine of economic growth is given by 
“human capital accumulation”, lower inequality mitigates credit rationing (so allowing 
more investments in human capital), resulting in higher growth rates. Credit rationing is 
instead a binding constraint when growth is fuelled by “physical capital accumulation”, 
because of large capitals that are required to become an entrepreneur and exploit 
economies of scale (Galor, 2006). This reasoning is based on the complementarity 
between physical and human capital, that is technology and high-skilled workers. In 
fact, we observed a marked increase in the wage gap due to skill heterogeneity in last 
decades, suggesting that inequality may rise even in a knowledge-based economy. All 
in all, lower inequality and higher and widespread levels of education, as resulting from 
full employment within a more advanced and green technological framework, are 
complex goals that could be achieved, but only by considering the political premises 
and consequences of economic evolution and technical change in a conflictual society. 
 
Indeed, it is difficult to say if the evolution of capitalism leads to deskilling or 
upskilling: on the one hand, we did not observe a historical process of deskilling 
(proletarisation) due to technical change and the mechanisation of productive processes; 
on the other hand, the upskilling phenomenon may remain confined in a limited fraction 
of the population, and low-skilled workers are the first to suffer the effects of both 
                                                 
13
 All in all, an economic policy intervention aimed at reaching full employment should take into 
consideration the political consequences of such a strategy, unless you intend to pursue a strategy of full 
employment through a substantial reduction in wages or, worse, that this may be the result of a repressive 
political shift (which would be unfortunately not a novelty in a historical perspective). 
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labour-saving technological progress and globalising dynamics (from offshoring 
outsourcing to migrations). For these reasons, a room for public intervention emerges 
especially in education: to develop workplace abilities and mainly as a way to lean how 
to adapt and learn anew (Hodgson, 2003). If this intervention will lead to full 
employment and raising wages, then a decrease of inequality should follow, potentially 
boosting human capital accumulation and (labour-saving) technological progress.14 In 
our view, however, this is not a ‘natural’ outcome of capitalist evolution but rather a 
development path to be sustained by an essential involvement of the public sector and a 
committed participation of people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 At the same time, less-developed countries would continue to benefit from production relocations from 
advanced economies (due to lower production costs), even from emerging countries, like China, that are 
already evolving towards high value added sectors at the frontier of technological progress, relocating 
some production activities in countries with lower labour costs (so further enlarging the “container” of 
capitalist accumulation). 
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